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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Microfinance has been spread around the world as a popular poverty reduction 
strategy. In 1997, the Microcredit Summit Campaign was launched with the goal of 
servicing 100 million of the world’s poorest households.  This is in line with the 
Millennium Development Goals, agreed to at the United Nations Millennium Summit, 
which set a challenging goal of halving the absolute poverty in the world by 2015.  
Micro-finance has a high potential to contribute to these Millennium Development Goals.  
As of December 2000, about 1600 microfinance institutions reported to the Microcredit 
Summit that more than 19 million of the poorest households around the world have 
access to financial services.  However, this leaves 81 million of the world’s poorest 
people to be reached before the Campaign target of 100 million is achieved.  If only 10 
percent of the 1580 microfinance institutions (MFIs) that reported to the Microcredit 
Summit could be scaled up to serve an average of 500,000 very poor households each, 
then the shortfall of 81 million could be overcome.  However, without capital to cover its 
operations, to finance its lending operations, and to leverage financial resources from 
commercial institutions, it is unlikely that microfinance institutions would be able to 
achieve this objective.  
Many pioneering MFIs all over the world have proven that they can deliver 
financial services to individuals and businesses that otherwise would not have access to 
financial services. However for many of these MFI’s, the dependence on donor funds 
increasingly constitutes an obstacle to growth, and thus they are now turning to other, 
commercial sources of funds.  The shortage of capital creates two major, interrelated 
problems for MFIs: (1) slower than optimal rates of growth due to shortage of funds, and 
(2) large operational deficits prior to institutional financial breakeven, which itself tends 
to limit optimal growth rates.  These operating deficits limit MFI access to capital, even 
at market rates.  While there is an undeniable need for MFIs to access capital that would 
enable them to make a greater contribution towards poverty-reduction, commercial 
lenders and equity investors (whether private, public or hybrid) have difficulties in 
identifying viable microfinance investments, or do not yet see microfinance with the poor 
as a potentially profitable investment opportunity.  This raises a key question: How can 
MFIs effectively communicate their prospects to potential mainstream investors?  
 
Section II of this paper examines the typical sources of financing for 
microfinance, followed by a discussion regarding the current practices of MFIs in raising 
capital.  To date, funding of MFI activities has come primarily from outright donor 
grants, government subsidies, and often debt capital, including debt with non-market 
terms favorable to the MFI.  Clearly, each funding source embraces charitable motives to 
support the beneficial poverty reduction strategies of the MFI.  However, especially in 
the current worldwide economic environment, these traditional sources of MFI financing 
may not be sufficient to allow MFIs to provide maximum services.  As such, MFIs are 
interested in approaching new classes of potential investors for participation in MFI 
projects.  The purpose of this section is to motivate a discussion for the potential use of 
equity capital in MFI financing by presenting the strengths and weaknesses of each 
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financing option.  We will also highlight operational aspects of MFIs that could impact 
capital raising opportunities. 
 
Section III begins with a brief review of the traditional narrative approach to 
fundraising.  We then outline classical finance techniques that could be used by the MFI 
to approach mainstream equity investors.  There is, almost certainly, a subset of this 
investor pool which would consider investing in MFI opportunities, even knowing that 
they would not expect to earn the full economic rate of return that such investments 
would otherwise require.  That is, these investors may be willing to accept a reduced rate 
of return on investment (ROI), in order to satisfy social motives that they may have.  
However, as part of their investment evaluation process, these investors would ask: 
 
 What would the market determined required expected rate of 
return for my MFI investment be? 
 
 What ROI do I expect to earn on my MFI investment? 
 
 Is the difference in the above two returns acceptable given my 
level of social motivation? 
 
 How will I ―monetize‖ my investment and when? 
 
 What are the cash flows available to me in this project? 
 
 Modern corporate finance provides directed techniques and analytical procedures 
to address these questions.  However, in preparing information for individual donors and 
government agencies, MFIs tend to emphasize descriptive documentation and have no 
need to address the above questions directly.  The purpose of Section III is to apply 
modern finance techniques to this important situation.  How would the MFI best organize 
its data, analyses and presentation to attract mainstream equity investors?  We will 
propose an analysis based on expected cash flows available to equity holders. 
 
 Finally, Section IV summarizes our conclusions and sets the stage for the field 
work that would be necessary to implement our recommendations. 
 
 
II.  SOURCES OF FUNDING 
 
 
A.  Donor and government grants and soft loans 
 
 Microfinance has received significant attention from the donor community, based 
upon its potential as a powerful tool for poverty alleviation.  As such, many millions of 
dollars have been spent on promoting microfinance programs around the world.  For most 
MFIs, the principal source of funding is from grants and highly subsidized loans, or so-
called soft loans.  Soft loans are obtained from multilateral banks (e.g., the World Bank, 
Inter-American Development Bank alike), government aid agencies (e.g., United States 
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Agency for International Development (USAID), UK Department for International 
Development (DFID), foundations (e.g., Ford Foundation) and apex organizations (e.g., 
Women’s World Banking, ACCION, FINCA).  Usually such grants and soft loans 
include conditions and requirements as to how the funds should be spent and are in 
limited dollar amounts.  However, most would agree that in order to achieve the goal of 
reaching the remaining 81 millions poorest households, MFIs would need to access 
capital above and beyond grants and soft loans. 
  
B.  Savings 
 
 Historically, deposits (demand deposits, passbook savings, time deposits, 
certificates of deposits and the like) have been a primary source of funds for financial 
institutions.  Hempel and Simonson (1999) have reported that, for US commercial banks, 
97% of their total liabilities are made up of demand deposits and time deposits.  Clearly, 
these savings accounts fuel the lending operations of the banks. Furthermore, Wisniwski 
(1999) reports that this has been true irrespective of the regional or cultural context in 
which the banks or related non-bank financial institutions have developed.   
 
 However, in most developing countries, especially in South, East and Central 
Asia, MFIs are not permitted to re-deploy depositor savings until they can meet certain 
minimum capital requirements mandated by regulatory authorities.  Unfortunately, such 
capital adequacy requirements are typically not met until the MFI is a mature institution, 
thereby precluding if from taking advantage of the potential leverage provided by these 
deposits.  We will explore this issue in more detail below. 
 
C.  Private Sector Capital 
 
 During the last decade, the microfinance community has recognized the 
limitations of donor and government subsidies in reaching a significant scale and scope 
of operations.  As many microcredit programs apply the so-called graduation principle in 
their lending operations, increasing the size of repeat loans according to their repayment 
record of previous loans, it is essential to raise/attract sufficient funds to sustain this 
process.  
 
 Thus, many MFI’s are moving away from donor funding into the more traditional 
sources of capital financing that typical corporations use.  Debt capital is often a first 
choice, either in the form of borrowings from commercial and central banks, or when 
capital markets are well-developed, long term debt instruments.  Hannig and Wisniwski 
(1999) point out that these debt obligations are attractive to both sides of the transaction, 
as they not only provide a steady source of income for the owners, but it also provides a 
stable source of funds for the issuers.  
 
 Equity, which is the focus of this paper, is another potential source of capital.  In 
fact, certain quasi-equity structures are in current use: 
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 Donations to the MFIs can be thought of as an equity 
investment, although the donor does not expect to receive a 
return on investment (ROI) or other monetary return 
 Apex organizations or Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) typically provide capital when they take an ownership 
position 
 Venture capital funds, enterprise equity funds or quasi-equity 
investment funds 
 Equity-like subordinated debt 
 Private placement funds 
 Limited partnerships or limited liability company participation 
 Institutional or individual investors interested in social returns  
 
 Clearly, none of the above represents equity as typically characterized by the 
financial community.  Classical equity investors would require some ROI in the form of 
future cash flow receipts.  Furthermore, many of the participations taken by the funds, 
partnerships and social investors above have characteristics more closely resembling debt 
than equity, namely, contractually bound repayment programs.   
 
D.  Evolution of microfinance financing 
 
 To illustrate a financing chronology moving toward equity financing, consider 
Table 1 below, a modified table from Calvin (2001).  Typical sources of financing are 
linked with four (4) representative stages of MFI evolution.   Donor grants and soft loans 
comprise the majority of the funding in the formative stages (Start-up, Operational Self-
sufficiency) of the organization; the early stage MFI will almost surely not qualify for 
commercial funding of any kind.  As the MFI matures to Financial Self-sufficiency, 
private debt capital becomes available.  As we will describe below, the debt structures are 
often laden with restrictive covenants and often must have guarantees attached.  It is only 
in the last stage of MFI evolution that traditional equity financing will be appropriate.  In 
Section III, we will outline procedures that the MFI might employ to employ Calvin’s 
last financing category: commercial equity. 
 
Wisniwski (1999) points out that, during the early stage when subsidized funding 
predominates, the lack of clear ownership can distort incentive structures and undermine 
sustainability of the enterprise.  This ―moral hazard‖ problem is well known in the 
finance literature and has motivated considerable research on the agent/principal issue; 
see Jensen and Meckling (1976) for the seminal work.  In essence, when costless 
verification of agent activities is impossible, principals will need to establish incentive 
arrangements for agents to eliminate the moral hazard and/or consume resources to 
monitor the activities of and to direct agents. Recent literature has explored implications 
of organizational structure, prototype incentive programs and various monitoring 
strategies on the agency problem; see for example Glaeser and Schleifer (1998) and Fehr 
(2003). 
 
 Furthermore, note that in the case of the early stage MFI, it may even be 
unrealistic to find a fully engaged principal in the agent/principal relationship.  The 
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typical donor is unlikely to monitor the activities of the MFI to the same extent as a 
commercial investor anticipating a financial return.  So then, another advantage to 
introducing equity into the capital structure of the MFI would be to introduce more 
discipline into operational activities and manager behavior. 
 
As the enterprise progresses through Stages II and III, commercial loans become 
increasingly relevant for mature Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  Properly 
structured, these vehicles can become a continuous source of reliable funding.  
Furthermore, these commercial loans begin to provide appropriate incentives and 
discipline to MFIs with the use of restrictive covenants.  Also, MFI mangers will begin to 
learn that good governance and management performance are important prerequisites for 
ongoing access to the capital market.  Note however, many jurisdictions require that 
commercial loans must be backed by third-party guarantees.  This issue will be discussed 
below.   
 
 
Table 1: Evolution of MFI financing   
       
  
Stage 
I: 
Start-
Up 
Stage II: 
Operational 
self-
sufficiency 
Stage III: 
Financial Self-
sufficiency 
Stage IV: Commercial 
level Return 
  NGO NGO NGO 
Licensed 
financial 
institution NGO 
Licensed 
financial 
institution 
Donor             
Grant and soft loans x x x x x x 
Internal             
Forced savings x x x   x   
Voluntary savings        x   x 
Private              
Debt             
Commercial loans   x x x x x 
Guarantee funds   x x x x x 
Bonds     x x x x 
Securitization     x x x x 
Inter-bank borrowing       x   x 
Equity             
Quasi-equity     x x x x 
Retained earnings     x x x x 
Socially responsible equity       x x   
Commercial equity         x x 
 
 
 When an NGO’s reaches Stage III, it typically begins to realize some retained 
earnings and is in a position to access quasi-equity.  Quasi-equity refers to medium to 
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long term, soft, subordinated loans which are designed to be repaid out of profits after 
institutional financial break-even.  Again, this vehicle is more analogous to a structured 
debt offering than a standard equity structure.  Also, at Stage III, we observe NGOs 
beginning to make use of asset securitization.  
 
 As the NGO progresses through Stage III, it can be transformed into a regulated 
financial institution.  A primary advantage of this transition is that the regulated financial 
institutions can access voluntary client savings in most jurisdictions.  As we have 
reported previously, client deposits have been a dominate source of funding for 
traditional financial institutions. During the last decade, the appropriateness of this 
funding source has become the focus of heated discussions among the microfinance 
community, see for example Otero (1989) and Hannig and  
Wisniwski (1999). There are at least three benefits to savings mobilization from the MFI 
perspective:  
 
 Financial self-sufficiency of the institution is fortified - savings 
represent a relatively stable and cheap source of funds 
 
 Dependency on external borrowing is reduced, allowing the 
institution to engage in community-based operations of its 
choice as opposed to the priorities of the lender, especially 
when the lender is a governments or donor agency  
 
 Saving services are more likely to be provided to the poor 
when mobilization provides an incentive to establish savings 
accounts 
 
 In addition to the ongoing discussion of the appropriateness of savings 
mobilization, there is a significant amount of literature on the relationship between 
savings and other sources of capital.  For example, Gadway and O’Donnell (1996) argue 
that locally mobilized savings are an ideal funding source for MFIs.  Otero (1989) 
proposes a gradual shift for MFIs away from donor grants and soft loans as funding 
sources to commercial sources of funds and, eventually, to public deposits.  She states 
that at an advanced stage of institutional evolution, savings mobilization will provide the 
largest share of capital.  In a similar vein, Jackelen and Rhyne (1991) argue that 
continuous support from the donor community leads MFIs to become highly dependent 
on subsidies and thereby discourages them from becoming a competitive and self-
sufficient financial intermediary.  With a more skeptical point of view, Schmidt and 
Zeitinger (1996) argue savings mobilization costs and risks may be material, and as such, 
alternative financing is preferred.   
 
 Stage IV characterizes NGOs and financial institutions that are beginning to 
achieve a significant level of retained earnings.  At this stage, the institution should be in 
position to attract both socially responsible equity and commercial equity so, in theory, 
its growth opportunities should be vastly expanded, Calvin (2001). 
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E. Innovative financing mechanisms 
 
 As Private Sector Involvement Working Group of Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poorest (CGAP) stated in 1996, ―There is a long way to go before MFIs can attract 
serious financial support from capital markets.  We’re on the very beginning of the 
learning curve. Creative efforts are now required to further develop financial instruments 
to facilitate the mobilization of funds for microfinance.‖  Financial instruments that have 
become more widely used in practice since that 1996 pronouncement include: 
 
Credit Guarantees 
 
 A credit guarantee is a financial instrument that encourages financial institutions 
to lend to retail microfinance institutions and/or directly to microenterprises that have 
good prospects of success, but are unable to provide sufficient collateral or do not have a 
suitable record of financial transactions, Bass(2000).  The guarantee functions as a 
promise by a guarantor to the lender that, in the event that the borrower defaults, the 
guarantor will repay the lender.  An ancillary benefit to this guarantee activity is to 
familiarize banks with the client and, in this process, induce banks to lend to clients that 
otherwise would not eligible for bank credit.  
 
 There are a growing number of guarantee schemes funded by multilateral donor 
agencies and financial institutions.  For example, USAID set up a loan portfolio 
guarantee (LPG) program for the Compagnie Bancaire de l’Afrique Occidentale (CBAO) 
in Senegal, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) launched a Global Credit 
Enhancement Facility (GCEF) in Fall, 2001.  Also, under the Micro and Small Enterprise 
Development Program, USAID has used innovative financial instruments including 
guarantees to facilitate lending to buyers of MFIs.  
 
 In setting a credit guarantee program, the guarantor will want to set the fee 
structure based on the costs of monitoring and information gathering as well as the cost 
of the risk transfer service provided.  It can often be difficult to establish a viable fee 
structure that fully compensates the guarantor for the services provided, Bass (2000).  
The agency issue is also present in that the lender’s interest in carefully screening clients 
and following up on delinquent loans is diminished with the introduction of the 
guarantee.  
 
Securitization 
 
 Securitization is another innovative attempt to link microenterprises with capital 
markets. Typically, this structure requires the creation of a single purpose corporation 
(SPC) that buys the microenterprise portfolio and capitalizes itself by issuing debentures 
for the capital market.  
 
 Mr. Michael Chu, former President and CEO of ACCION International, has said, 
―With the right partner, securitization can create an alternative microenterprise finance 
system that deals with the capital markets, in the language of the capital markets, in a 
market for which the capital markets are not suited.‖   For example, ACCION 
International and its affiliate, Fundacion Ecuatoriana de Desarrollo (FED), piloted 
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securitization in Ecuador. He explained: ―SPC’s equity of approximately $2 million will 
come from FED, a local financial partner, ACCION International (through the Gateway 
Fund), and others.  The SPC uses its cash to purchase $105 of portfolio from FED; but it 
pays FED $100 and puts the remaining $5 in a reserve which it pays on collection of the 
loan.  This reserve amounts to roughly 5% of the portfolio that it purchased, so the SPC is 
protected by five times the historic rate of default of the portfolio.  In addition, the SPC 
has $2 million dollars of equity, so anyone who buys paper issued by the SPC is highly-
protected.  It is projected that this structure will receive an AAA rating from the rating 
agencies.‖      
 
 
Debt instruments 
 
 There are a few initiatives to issue debt instruments in microfinance. Bancosol, a 
microfinance institution in Bolivia, has issued certificates of deposit, which trade on the 
Bolivian stock exchange.  Bancosol has also issued long-term debt instrument partially 
guaranteed by the USAID fund. Senior management of Bancosol has stated that the 
institution will continue to reduce its reliance on expensive interbank loans through the 
issuance of bonds and certificates of deposit.  Over time, the hope is that savings 
mobilization will assume an ever larger proportion of funding.   
 
 In Paraguay, ACCION’s affiliate Fundacion Paraguaya, as an NGO, issued a debt 
instrument through the securities exchange of Paraguaya.  Before issuing the paper, 
ACCION conducted a formal analysis employing a variant of an assessment tool used by 
bank examiners in the United States.  The rating from this analysis coupled with a clearly 
articulated business plan was important in the debt issuance process.  In exploring the use 
of equity capital for MFIs, we will argue that financial analyses and data of these types 
will be necessary. 
 
Specialized equity funds 
 
 Specialized equity funds such as Profund, DEVCAP and AfriCap, created with 
donor support, take equity stakes in MFIs, Silva (1998).  Each of these vehicles has a 
unique structure, size and geographical focus - Profund focuses on Latin America and 
Caribbean, AfriCap focuses on Africa, while DEVCAP was established to support micro 
enterprise lending by four U.S. development agencies (Save the Children, Catholic Relief 
Services, Appropriate Technology International and SEED Capital Development Fund) 
that support MFIs in 54 countries.  These commercial investment funds focus on social 
returns, understanding that the financial returns will likely be below the appropriate risk 
adjusted market rate.  
 
 These donor-supported funds are complemented by similar equity investments 
made by international investment companies.  For example, The Triodos-Doen 
Foundation, founded in 1994, provides equity capital to MFIs all over the world in 
addition to loans and loan guarantees. The Calvert Targeted Community Investments and 
the Internationale Micro Investitionen Aktiengesellschaft (IMI) have similar equity 
investment programs.  
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 In conjunction with MFI forays in the commercial capital markets, rating agencies 
that analyze MFIs for commercial investors have come into being and have also attracted 
donor interest.  For example, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) are launching the pilot phase of a joint 
initiative called the Microfinance Rating and Assessment Fund (MRAF).  An objective of 
the Pilot Rating and Assessment Fund is to build a supply of competent ratings and 
appraisal services by supporting organizations that perform high-quality assessments, 
particularly agencies in developing countries.  A secondary objective is to build a reliable 
database on different types of MFIs around the world that can serve as a reference point 
for donors, investors, banking supervisors, and MFIs themselves (CGAP2).  A longer-
term goal of this initiative is to enable a greater flow of private sector resources to the 
microfinance sector by improving the quality, availability, and frequency of information 
on the risk and performance of MFIs, CGAP2(2001).  
 
 
 
III.  STRATEGIES FOR RAISING CAPITAL 
 
 
A.  Traditional Approach  
 
 As a poverty reduction vehicle, microfinance has attracted large sums of donor 
grants and subsidies.  The traditional approach to raising capital from donors and 
philanthropy sources often begins with a proposal that includes descriptive information in 
a narrative form.  In particular, a typical proposal requesting funding from donors or 
philanthropy includes background information of the organization, its current or proposed 
products and services, a target clientele, expected social benefits and the amount of 
funding required.  The expected returns to potential investors are usually described in 
terms of the number of poor people to be served, and the types of impact it will have on 
the lives of the poor.  A three-year project ―Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise 
Programs‖ (AIMS), funded by United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), presents a framework for evaluating the impact of micro-finance programs 
along these lines.
1
   This framework has become widely used by many micro-finance 
programs in reporting their social returns.  The framework posits that impact occurs at the 
following levels: 
 
 At the family/household level, microenterprises contribute towards a net 
increase in family/household income, asset accumulation, and labor 
productivity.  Income invested in assets such as savings and education 
increase family/household economic security by making it possible to meet 
basic needs when the flow of income is interrupted. 
 
 At the enterprise level, the impact is represented by changes in income, 
employment, assets, and volume of production. 
 
                                                          
1
 For more detailed discussion about this framework, check the publications at http://www.mip.org under 
AIMS. 
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 At the individual level, change is measured by the clients’ capacity to make 
decisions and investments that improve business performance and personal 
income, which in turn strengthens the family/household economic portfolio 
and often translate into personal empowerment. 
 
 At the community level, microenterprises can provide new employment 
opportunities, stimulate backward and forward linkages to other community 
enterprises, and attract new income from outside the community.  To the 
degree that the poor benefit from such increased economic activity, 
microenterprise interventions can have additional equity impacts. 
 
 These relationships clarify paths of impact by which microenterprise interventions 
can contribute to the goals of poverty alleviation and economic growth: 
 
 Family/households improve their economic security; 
 Enterprises become more stable and even grow;  
 Individuals increase their control over resource allocations and improve their 
well-being; and 
 Communities develop economically through enterprise activity that provides 
goods and services, attracts income, and creates jobs. 
 
 To assess change within these pathways or relationships, the framework defines 
―domains of impact‖ at each level.  Within each domain, markers of change, or 
indicators, are identified to measure impact.  For example, at the level of the enterprise, 
financial change can be measured by changes in income or business assets.  These 
markers of change can function alone as an indicator of impact, or they can be assessed in 
combination to capture such things as (1) the movement of family/households toward (or 
away from) greater economic security, (2) the progression of enterprises between stages 
of development, (3) changes in individual well being, and (4) changes in community 
development.  
 
 Only a very few microfinance organizations provide audited financial statements.   
As was described in one of the viewpoints published by the Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poor (CGAP), a frustrated investor’s tale reads:  
 
 An investment banker expressed exasperation at the response of NGO MFIs to 
requests for basic financial reports and information.  She was often told either that such 
reports were unavailable, or was provided with incomplete or unreliable data.  She had 
gone out on a limb to broaden her bank’s options to include NGO MFIs, but they had 
been unable to respond appropriately.  ―This is precisely the type of behavior that helps 
contribute to a perception among investors that NGOs are not serious players in micro 
finance,‖ she concluded (Pearce, 2002).  
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B.  Financial Analysis Approach  
   
 The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the financial procedures that a 
mainstream equity investor would use to evaluate an MFI equity investment.  The 
investor will be most concerned with the package of cash flows, generated by the MFI, 
which will be available.  The MFI should assume that the investor will attempt to 
estimate the amount and timing of cash flows that will be available to provide his/her 
return on investment.  In soliciting equity participation from investors, the MFI would be 
well served to provide this data as part of the offering circular. 
 
 We will assume that the MFI collects financial and operating data typically 
required to prepare accounting statements.  Whether or not the statements actually get 
produced is not crucial for our analyses, since that data would need to be modified 
anyway.  However, we would certainly recommend that the MFI produces the full range 
of accounting statements.  Clearly, the investment community will react more favorably 
to an enterprise with financial reporting and control procedures in place. 
 
 In evaluating his/her potential equity investment in the MFI, the investor will 
discount cash flows available to the equity holder at a market determined required 
expected rate of return for investments of the given risk level.  The present value (PV) of 
these cash flows will be compared to the level of the initial equity investment.  If the PV 
exceeds the initial investment, this investment opportunity would be a desirable 
investment project.  Stated alternatively, the net present value (NPV) of the investment 
project would be greater than zero, and the project should be undertaken.  Refer to any 
standard financial management text, e.g., Brealey and Myers (2001), and references 
therein to review the NPV apparatus and its applicability for project selection. 
 
 However, an NPV >0 scenario is not what we would expect in the microfinance 
setting.  It is likely that, for most MFI equity investment opportunities, the PV of equity 
cash flows will be less than the initial investment.  In classical project analysis, such an 
investment would be rejected as unacceptable.  In our case, we can view the difference 
between the amount of initial investment and the PV of cash inflows as a measure of the 
socially beneficial contribution (donation) made to the enterprise by the provider of 
capital.  For investors who prefer to evaluate the investment in terms of rate of return, we 
will provide a procedure using the internal rate of return (IRR) method. 
 
Let 
 
  E0 = equity investment at time t=0 
 
  CFEi = cash flow available to equity at time t=i, i=1, 2,   
 
ki         = required expected return on equity during the ith time period; 
note that many standard analyses estimate k to be constant during 
the investment horizon, but we will describe a case below in 
which it is may be more productive to work with different 
required returns through time 
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  IRR = internal rate of return on the investment 
 
The relevant calculation for the equity investor is 
 
  NPV = -E0 + i
i
i
1 k1
CFE
i
 
 
  If NPV>0, we have that 
i
i
i
0
k1
CFE
E  
 
 This situation represents the commercially viable investment which the investor 
would choose to undertake even without a socially motivated desire.  If 
 
   
i
i
0
k1
iCFEE  
  then 
   
i
i
0
k1
iCFEE  
 
represents that portion of the initial E0 investment  that is effectively a socially motivated 
donation. 
 
 In order to calculate the NPV, it will be necessary to: 
 
 Estimate CFEi for all i 
 
 Estimate ki for all i 
 
 Employ a terminal value  procedure to make the infinite sum in the 
NPV calculation tractable 
 
 For demonstration purposes in this paper, we will assume that the potential equity 
investor has established an estimate for his/her required expected return, k.  This assumes 
that the investor has (1) established a market determined required expected rate of return 
for equity investment with the same risk characteristics as the MFI, and (2) is satisfied in 
working with a constant k for all i. 
 
 While investors may well not have done rigorous analysis to estimate k, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that they can produce a necessary hurdle rate for the proposed 
equity investment. 
 
 Assuming that k is constant for all i will depend upon, among other things, how 
the MFI will use the proceeds of the equity financing.  If the MFI will use the funds to 
expand its current lending and operating activities, it is reasonable to work with ki = k for 
all i.  Given the debt financing already being employed by the MFI, it is probable that its 
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debt to equity ratio would remain relatively constant looking forward.  If, however, the 
MFI will employ the new capital to retire debt through time, it will be necessary to adjust 
the required expected return based on the pro forma debt ratio, which will change 
materially through time due to the debt repayments.  This second scenario is analogous to 
the standard venture capital (VC) environment wherein the enterprise is intentionally 
over-levered prior to the VC equity capital commitment.  In this case, all cash flows 
generated during the early years of the project are used to pay down debt in order to 
move the debt to equity ratio into a more normal range.  Since the debt ratio will change 
on a year-to-year basis, k will have to change in order to reflect the changes in financial 
leverage.  Refer to the Baldwin (2001) references for the relevant VC analysis. 
 
 To estimate CFEi for all i, the MFI will use pro forma operating and financial 
data.  It is important to understand that the cash flows required are not the Free Cash 
Flows (FCF) typically prepared by financial analysts.  FCFs represent cash flows that are 
available to both debt holders and equity holders.  To produce equity cash flows, it is 
necessary to include debt-related cash flows normally not included in FCF, namely, 
interest expense cash outflows, cash outflows for pro forma debt retirements, and cash 
inflows from any pro forma debt issuance.  So, on a period-by-period basis, the projected 
equity cash flow statement would be: 
 
Net Income 
+ Depreciation 
- Increase in Net Working Capital 
-Gross Capital Expenditures 
 
Cash Flow Available for Debt and Equity 
- Debt Repayment 
+ New Debt Issues 
 
 
CFE 
  
 
 It is important to begin the CFE calculation with Net Income, not EBIT (earnings 
before interest and taxes) in order to include interest payments on existing and any newly 
issued debt.  Also, as the MFI progresses through Stage IV in its development, it may be 
subject to taxes in some jurisdictions.  If the activities of the MFI are non-taxable, simply 
work with a tax rate of 0%.  Adding back depreciation to Net Income recognizes that 
depreciation is a non-cash expense.  The analysis also captures the necessary cash re-
investment back into the MFI with the Net Working Capital and Capital Expenditure 
accounts.  The resultant cash flow is available for debt principal repayments, and would 
be augmented by any new debt issues.  As we have suggested, in many VC situations, all 
cash flow would initially be used to retire existing debt in order to reduce the high debt to 
equity ratio, but we do not require the MFI to do so.  It is the pro forma package of CFEs 
that the MFI equity investor will use in the NPV analysis. 
 
 In theory, the equity investor will own all CFEs to perpetuity.  For analytical 
purposes, the analyst will explicitly project some finite number of CFEs (say, 5 to 10 
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years worth) and estimate a terminal value at the end of the pro forma period.  This 
terminal value is, in essence, the PV of all remaining CFEs to perpetuity.  Borrowing 
from the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature, see Fruhan (1993), we offer two 
alternatives to estimate TVN, the terminal value at time N, which corresponds to the end 
of the formal projection period: 
 
(1) If it is reasonable to project that CFEs will remain constant after time N, 
then 
 
k
CFE
TV NN  
 
Under this assumption, the remaining cash flows are a perpetuity.   It is 
simply the present value of the perpetuity.  As Fruhan (1993) points out, it 
may be preferable to work with Net Income (N.I.) at time N instead of 
CFEN.   Under a zero growth assumption, it may be reasonable to project 
that no additional working capital investments will be required and that 
gross capital investments will equal depreciation in order to simply 
maintain net fixed assets at a constant level.  In that case, 
 
k
IN N..TVN  
 
(2) If the CFEs are expected to grow at a constant rate g after time N (maybe 
because the operations of the MFI are expected to expand), the Gordon 
constant growth model can be employed, see Brealey and Myers (2001), 
 
gk
gCFEN 1TVN  
 
 The M&A literature also offers procedures based on either earnings or book value 
multiples, but these would be extremely difficult to apply here.  Since no comparable 
publicly traded MFIs would exist, the necessary multiples would be unavailable. 
 
 Our equity investor is now ready to perform either an NPV or IRR analysis. 
 
  NPV Analysis: 
 
N
N
N
N
k
TV
k
CFE
k
CFE
ENPV
111
1
1
0   
 
As before, if NPV<0, NPV or 
0E
NPV
 captures the social investment being made. 
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IRR Analysis: 
 
  
N
N
N
N
IRR
TV
IRR
CFE
IRR
CFE
ENPV
111
0
1
1
0   
 
In a manner similar to the above, if IRR < k, k-IRR represents a measure of the social 
investment being made. 
 
 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to review financing sources commonly used in 
microfinance, and to outline financial analyses that MFIs might use in approaching 
potential equity investors.  These proposed financial procedures, while quite common 
corporate techniques in well-developed countries, have not been widely applied in 
microfinance.  While this may partially be attributed to the lack of comprehensive 
financial and operating data in MFIs, most providers of donor and grant funding have 
been satisfied to concentrate on the social benefits of their investments.  We have argued 
that, if mainstream investors are to become investors in microfinance projects, they will 
likely require financial analyses similar to those used for their for-profit investing 
activities. 
 
These equity investors will be concerned with the present value of the cash flows 
they expect to receive from the microfinance investment.  This thinking is quite 
analogous to an equity investor ―valuing‖ his/her stock holdings as the present value of 
the dividend stream expected.  Even if the microfinance equity investor does not expect 
to earn the full risk adjusted required expected return on the microfinance investment, 
he/she will want a numerical estimate of the shortfall.  In addition to providing the means 
to estimate this shortfall, we have argued that this shortfall can measure the magnitude of 
the socially beneficial donation that the investor is implicitly making as part of the equity 
investment. 
 
If our proposal is to be implemented, much work remains to be done.  In this 
paper, we have simply provided an overview of techniques that could be applied.  For 
example, we have not addressed, but are aware of, the difficulties that would arise in data 
collection and parameter estimation.  Note that similar considerations are material even in 
the corporate setting when well-developed public capital markets exist.  On the other 
hand, it is our hope that this paper can set the stage for a dialogue between MFI managers 
and potential equity investors. 
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